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of extensive biological experiments. Although the experts who
testified were by no means in complete accord, there was ample
evidence to justify the court's conclusion that the presence of
oil in the quantities found above the oyster beds impaired the
ability of the oysters to absorb nourishment from the water and
resulted eventually in starvation.
The issue of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct
was dealt with more sparingly than the other questions of the
controversy. The court was satisfied that some of the oil escaped
through carelessness on the part of the pumper or gauger, and
that leaks developed in the pipes. One might conjecture whether
such a case as this really rests upon negligence, or whether the
trespassory nature of the invasion, or theories of nuisance, might




Appeals and Appellate Procedure
In Mistich v. Holman' plaintiff petitioned for a suspensive
appeal and requested permission to file a statement of facts at
any time before the return day of the appeal, reserving to the
defendant the right to file a statement 'of facts. The plaintiff
could not get the defendant to draft jointly a statement of facts.2
The plaintiff thereupon asked the trial judge to make a statement
according to his recollection of the facts pursuant to Article 603
of the Code of Practice. The trial judge refused, stating that he
was without authority to do so after the signing of the order of
appeal, and on the further ground that the chief deputy clerk of
court was without authority to extend the period of time fixed
by law for making a statement of facts. The supreme court, on
appeal, held that once an order of appeal has been granted and
the, appeal bond signed, the appeal is perfected, and the trial
court is divested of jurisdiction, except the right to test the suffi-
ciency of the appeal bond as of the date when filed. Also, that
*Student, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 205 La. 171, 17 So. (2d) 23 (1944).
2. Art. 602, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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in order for the supreme court to consider a statement of facts,
it would have to be made in compliance with Article 601 of the
Code of Practice, or the two subsequent articles. This the plain-
tiff had failed to do in the instant case. Appellant's application
for additional time to cure the omission in accordance with Act
234 of 1932 was also denied for the reason that said act had only
to do with the correction of an incomplete or erroneous tran-
script and does not enable an appellant to add a statement of
fact to the record after the jurisdiction of the trial court was
divested by the taking of an appeal.
In State ex rel. Parish of Plaquemines v. Baynard, the court
reaffirmed recent jurisprudence to the effect that "to take away
the right of appeal, there must be an unconditional voluntary and
absolute acquiescence in the judgment on the part of the appel-
lant who must have intended to abandon his right. ' 4 The court
declared that a person cannot be said to acquiesce in a judgment
so as to preclude an appeal when he merely abides by that part
of the judgment which cannot prejudice -his rights or which he
concedes to be correct. It was further stated that a person may
appeal from so much of a judgment as is prejudicial to him with-
out complaining of the whole judgment; and even execution of so
much of the judgment as he does not complain of does not con-
stitute acquiescence in so much thereof as he does appeal from.'
Angelette v. Hardie6 stated without discussion, that an appeal
may be had without bond where the appellant is prosecuting his
action in forma pauperis. Though not specified, it appears ob-
vious that the appeal involved was devotutive rather than sus-
pensive.
In the interest of economy, where a record in another suit
which had been introduced on trial was present in the archives
of the supreme court, a motion to compel plaintiff appellants to
supplement their transcript by having the district court clerk
send typewritten copies of such record up to supreme court was
denied. The court felt that Section 12 of Rule I of the Rules of
the Supreme Court, providing that where there is a first and
3. 204 La. 834, 16 So. (2d) 451 (1943).
4. Sanderson v. Frost, 198 La. 295, 805, 3 So. (2d) 626, 629 (1941).
5. Cf. Art. 567, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Augustin v. Farnsworth,
155 La. 1053, 99 So. 868 (1924); Kittredge v. Grau, 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723
(1925), and others. The earlier jurisprudence interpreting Code of Practice
Article 567 had held that a person who voluntarily executes, either partial~y
or in toto, a judgment rendered for or against him, thereby acquiesces in
it and he cannot appeal. The rule to which the court is now committed re-
quires a voluntary acquiescence in the whole of the judgment.
6. 204 La. 972, 16 So. (2d) 537 (1944).
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second appeal in the same case, or growing out of the same case,
the transcript used for the first appeal may, on leave of the court,
be used for the subsequent appeal was broad enough to allow
the court to consider those transcripts already on file with it in
lieu of typewritten copies thereof. 7
In Thompson v. Jones,8 after judgment for the defendant,
plaintiff moved for a new trial or rehearing on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence. The supreme court refused the plain-
tiff a new trial or rehearing, having ascertained that the plain-
tiff, by exercise of due diligence, could have obtained alleged
newly discovered evidence before first trial.
Jurisdiction
In re Sherill9 restated the ironclad rule that the supervisory
jurisdiction of the supreme court cannot be invoked unless relator
has first exhausted his remedies in the lower court. Application
for a writ of prohibition directing the judge of the juvenile court
not to proceed in trial because of alleged lack of jurisdiction was
refused. The supreme court declared that the petitioner should
not apply to the supreme court for such writ until his plea to the
jurisdiction had been presented to and overruled by the lower
court.
An appeal to the supreme court will not lie to correct the
overruling of a plea to the jurisdiction filed on the trial of a mis-
demeanor. Article 7, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution of
1921 restricts the appellate criminal jurisdiction of the supreme
court to those cases involving a possible penalty of death or im-
prisonment at hard labor.'
In Porter v. O'Neal," it was held that where the Louisiana
Public Service Commission issued a certificate to the plaintiff
pursuant to Act 301 of 1938, the plaintiff should seek the protec-
tion of his right thus acquired before the commission. The
plaintiff should invoke the jurisdiction of the courts only where
the commission ignored some fundamental right or invaded some
7. Cockerell v. Moran Corporation of the South, 204 La. 405, 15 So. (2d)
805 (1943). See also Rule I, Section 12 of the Supreme Court Rules.
8. 205 La. 118, 17 So. (2d) 5 (1944).
9. 204 La. 1096, 16 So. (2d) 885 (1944).
10. State v. Lejeune, 205 La. 708, 18 So. (2d) 33 (1944). This was a crimi-
nal prosecution for "neglect of family" which doesn't provide punishment
by death or Imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant's remedy was to invoke
the supervisory jurisdiction of the court by application for writs of certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition. Cf. State v. Borum, 188 La. 846, 178 So. 371
(1937).
11. 205 La. 445, 17 So. (2d) 622 (1944).
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constitutional guarantee of the plaintiff. The plaintiff should
first exhaust his remedies before the commission.
Supervisory Writs
By four to three decision, the court, in Wilson Sporting Goods
Company v. Alwes, 12 dismissed the relator's application for writs
of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, recalling a writ of cer-
tiorari and dismissing a rule nisi previously issued. The relator
had not delivered or mailed to the trial judge and adverse party's
attorney a copy of his petition for said writs"3 as required by
Rule XIII, Section 7, of Rules of Supreme Court.
Writs of certiorari and prohibition were denied in Blaize v.
Hayes14 also. The supreme court grounded its denial on the cor-
rectness of the judgment of the district court. The latter tribunal,
in a suit brought by plaintiff, appointee of the governor to fill
unexpired term, held that the appointment was valid since less
than a year remained of the unexpired term."5
In Edwards v. Hester,' the supreme court declared that, in
applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, suf-
ficient notice is given the adverse party, if such notice was ac-
tually delivered "in time for him to present his side of the case
...." The fact that a certified copy of petition was not served
upon adverse party until next morning after petition for writs
was filed in, supreme court did not violate Section 7 of Rule XIII
of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
12. 204 La. 637, 16 So. (2d) 217 (1943).
13. The relator had, however, complied with Rule XIII, Section 2 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Higgins based their dissents primarily
upon the ground that though an application for remedial writs may be
denied for noncompliance with Rule XIII, Section 7, nevertheless the require-
ment of the rule should be considered as waived if the court, either inadver-
tently or designedly, issues a writ of certiorari and rule nisi, as was done
here. They point out that it is a very different thing to deny ab initto an
application for writs, which would allow counsel to reapply and to recall
and rescind a writ of certiorari and rule nisi which might have the effect of
res Judicata in that the party would be shut off from further relief. Section
2 of Rule XIII, while making it mandatory for the applicant to give the re-
quired notice of intention to apply for writs, expressly provides that failure
to do so is not a ground for dismissing the application or rescinding the
writs issued. Failure of the court to include this proviso In Section 7 of
Rule XIII caused the majority of the court to consider the requirements of
that rule as sacramental.
14. 204 La. 263, 15 So. (2d) 217 (1943).
15. See La. Const. of 1921, Art VII, § 69.
16. 205 La. 549, 17 So. (2d) 820 (1944). Cf. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v.
Alwes, 204 La. 445, 16 So. (2d) 217 (1943).
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Extraordinary Writs
A writ of mandamus seeking reinstatement as state troopers
was denied where the supreme court decided that application
made eighteen months after dismissal constituted laches on part
of relators. Relators' plea that they were awaiting determina-
tion of constitutionality of relevant acts of legislature in another
suit was held not excusable delay."7
On certiorari and review the supreme court upheld the rein-
statement of a teacher in the same school from which she had
been discharged. The ruling was based upon the acquiescence
by the school board in such decision. The supreme court ex-
pressly declared that it was not setting a precedent "that a teacher
must be reinstated in the same school from which he or she was
dismissed."'18
The supreme court, in State ex rel. Jagneaux v. Jagneaux,19
reiterated the doctrine that a writ of habeas corpus is proper
remedy for obtaining the custody of a minor child by the person
legally entitled thereto.
Capacity
A foreign corporation's compliance or non-compliance with
Act 8 of the 3rd Extra Session of 1935 relates to its right and
capacity to prosecute and stand in judgment in a suit. That ques-
tion has nothing whatever to do with the corporation's cause of
action as such. It involves an affirmative defense which must be
raised by special plea and disposed of by the introduction of evi-
dence.20
17. State ex rel. Boudreaux v. Alford, 205 La. 46, 55, 16 So. (2d) 901, 903
(1944). The court declared ". . . awaiting a final decision in a similar case
does not constitute a sound excuse for the delay of the relators in asserting
their rights."
1& State ex rel. Hamberlain v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 205
La. 34, 16 So. (2d) 897 (1944). See also State ex rel. Bass v. Vernon Parish
School Board, 194 So. 74 (La. App. 1940), and State ex rel. Broyles v. Tang-
pahoa Parish School Board, 6 So. (2d) 696 (La. App. 1942). See also State ex
rel. Nobles v. Bienville Parish School Board, 198 La. 688, 4 So. (2d) 649 (1941).
19. 206 La. 107, 18 So.(2d) 913 (1944). See also State v. Aucoin, 174 La. 7,
139 So. 645 (1932), regarding use of habeas corpus as ancillary to suits for
separation from bed and board to secure the custody of a child.
20. Hess Warming and Ventilating Co., Inc. v. Home Comforts Corpora-
tion, 205 La. 1045, 18 So. (2d) 611 (1944). It is submitted that the proper plea
to invoke is an exception to procedural capacity (or exception of want of
capacity, as it is generally termed). See R. J. Brown Co. v. Grosjean, 189
La. 778, 180 So. 634 (1938). If this be true, the issue must be presented in
Zimine Zits inasmuch as that exception is a dilatory one. However, the court
of appeal in Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Parker, 172 So. 586 (La. App. 1937)
allowed the question to be raised by an exception to the jurisdiction.
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The issue whether a foreign corporation has sufficiently com-
plied with Act 8 of the 3rd Extra Session of 1935, which denies
such corporation recourse to the courts of this state unless and
until it has qualified by law to do business herein and unless and
until it has paid all taxes and licenses due the state, cannot be
raised by an exception of no cause of action. The function of this
exception is not to traverse the allegations of the petition, but is
to test their legal sufficiency. This issue involves an affirmative
defense which must be raised by a special plea and disposed of
by the introduction of evidence.
Contempt
It was held 1 that the use of insulting language in a petition
for certiorari served on judges of the court of appeal and filed in
the supreme court, in session, constituted contempt of court. The
supreme court, conceding that judges of the court of appeal and
counsel for petitioners were not physically present, still main-
tained there was a sufficient contempt of court.22
Costs
In Senseley v. First National Life Insurance Company,28 the
defendant had asked for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit under
Article 3519 of the Revised Civil Code of 1870. The clerk of the
district court refused to accept and file the motion. He took the
position that the defendant would first have to pay $21.08, costs
due by plaintiff, in pursuance of Act 186 of 1940. The supreme
court decided that the defendant was entitled to a dismissal of
the suit, declaring that Act 186 of 1940 was not applicable. The
latter act contemplates a voluntary withdrawal of a suit, whereas
Article 3519 of the Revised Civil Code contemplates a forced
withdrawal by operation of law.
Section 3 of Act 95 of the Extra Session of 1921, making the
Louisiana Highway Commission 24 a body corporate and "as such
liable to sue and be sued," did not make that body liable to pay
interest and costs other than those incurred for the taking of
testimony. Nor did Act 4 of 1942.25
21. Lanoix v. Home Indemnity Co. of New York, 204 La. 1044, 16 So. (2d)
834 (1943).
22. See La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 125; La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX § 17;
Rules of Supreme Court, Rule X, § 4.
23. 205 La. 61, 16 So. (2d) 906 (1944).
24. Predecessor of the Department of Highways.
25. Makofsky v. Department of Highways, 205 La. 1029, 18 So. (2d) 605
(1944). See also Boxwell v, Department of Highways, 203 La, 760, 14 So. (2d)
627 (1943).
I. [Vol. VI
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Motion for New Trial
Where a judgment was rendered on December 2, 1930, and
the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on December 5, 1930,
it was held that the court's action, ex proprio motu, granting a
new trial, on May 13, 1938, came too late.2 6
Third Party Opposition
In Atkins v. Smith, 2  the supreme court held that a third
opposition in no way depends upon the outcome of the original
suit between the original plaintiff and defendant. The court
pointed out that the settled jurisprudence of this state and the
Code of Practice 28 clearly establish that the third opponent does
not have to inquire into or depend upon the validity of the pro-
ceedings between the plaintiff and the defendant in the original
suit. It was consequently held that the disposal of the main de-
mand did not justify the court of appeal in dismissing the third
opposition as a nonsuit, but, on the contrary, the appellate court
should have passed upon the issues so raised.
Exceptions
In Gerald v. Standard Oil Company of Louisiana,29 the su-
preme court followed the general rule that contributory negli-
gence must be specially pleaded. The court recognized the ex-
ception to this general rule, to wit, "where the plaintiff alleges
facts affirmatively showing that he was guilty of contributory
negligence, the defendant may raise the issue by exceptions of
no right or cause of action." However, the allegations of fact of
the plaintiff's petition did not affirmatively show that the plain-
tiffs were contributorily negligent. The court therefore decided
that the defendant's exceptions of no right or cause of action
should be overruled.
Enforcement of Judgments
In Isaac v. Comision Reguladora Del Mercado de Henequen,80
the court reaffirmed the Louisiana jurisprudence to the effect that
a garnishee should be protected against double pa:ment of a
26. Mitchell v. Louisiana Industrial Life Ins. Co., 204 La. 855, 16 So.(2d)
458 (1943). On May 9, 1938, the court had overruled the motion for a new
trial, but subsequently the judge ex officio set aside this previous ruling and.
granted the new trial.
27. 204 La. 458, 15 So. (2d) 855 (1943).
28. Art. 398, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
29. 204 La. 690, 16 So. (2d) 233 (1943).
30. 204 La. 1, 14 So. (2d) 865 (1943).
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single debt, and granted full faith and credit to the garnishment
judgment of another state. Cusachs v. Cusachs1 reiterated the
doctrine that property of any kind held in pledge by a creditor
may be seized at the instance of another creditor of the pledgor;
and sold subject to the claim of the pledge.
Rules of the Supreme Court
Section 5 of Rule XII of the Rules of the Supreme Court was
flatly applied in Blaize v. Hayes,12 where the court declared that
an application for rehearing will not be considered where the
court has refused to grant a writ of certiorari or a supervisory
writ or a rule nisi.
The supreme court refused to "render a decision on a moot
question" in State ex rel. Jones v. Stater.2 8 The suit was brought
for the purpose of excluding the defendant as sheriff for an un-
expired term. By the time the action came before the supreme
court on certiorari, the defendant had been nominated to fill the
office, and decree by the court could not affect. The court, find-
ing that a consent judgment was also a compromise judgment,
refused to annul said judgment for alleged error of law, in
Couret v. Couret."
In reassigning a case for further argument, the court held
that it might do so within its discretion. However, it was stated
that Section 1912 of the Revised Statutes (granting a plaintiff the
privilege of reargument as of right) had become inoperative and
ineffective."'
Five hundred dollars was held not an excessive fee for a
curator ad hoc, in Cockrell v. Moran Corporation of the South.8 6
The court stated that the responsibility incurred, the amount
involved, the extent and character of the labor performed, the
legal experience and knowledge of the attorney involved, and
the ability of the debtor to pay, must all be considered in the final
determination.
In Watson v. Harvey,37 the plaintiff obtained an order from
the court, pursuant to Act 326 of 1942, that the defendants appear
before court for cross-examination under Act 115 of 1934. The
31. 204 La. 316, 15 So. (2d) 316 (1943).
32. 204 La. 298, 15 So. (2d) 228 (1943).
33. 205 La. 1077, 18 So. (2d) 627 (1944).
34. 206 La. 85, 18 So. (2d) 661 (1944).
35. State v. Aucoin, 204 La. 301, 15 So. (2d) 318 (1943). C. J. O'Niell was of
the opinion that Section 1912 of the Revised Statutes was still operative.
36. 205 La. 761, 18 So. (2d) 174 (1944).
37. 205 La. 813, 18 So. (2d) 305 (1944).
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defendants opposed the order on the ground that Act 326 of 1942
had application to witnesses but not to parties litigant. Defen-
dants further contended that the plaintiff's remedy was relegated
to taking defendants' testimony by deposition. The supreme court
held that the decisions on which the defendants based their con-
tentions88 were modified by Act 326 of 1942 wherein Section 3941
of Revised Statutes of 1870 was specifically repealed. The court
declared that the plaintiff had, therefore, proceeded properly in
the instant case.
In Slater v. Blaize,89 court followed established jurisprudence
to the effect that person in possession -and claiming title to public
office may resort to injunctive proceedings pending an orderly
determination of title to office. It was further declared that the
proper procedure in cases where the person claiming title to a
public office is not in actual possession thereof, is by quo war-
ranto proceedings.40
In State ex rel. Riddle v. Jeansonne,"I a proceeding for re-
moval of a sheriff was brought under Section 6 of Article IX of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. The suit was dismissed, the
court holding that the sheriff's failure to obey the requirement
of Act 286 of 1940 was not sufficient to justify his removal. On
application for rehearing the court asserted that since the sheriff
had been nominated for another term, the controversy had be-
come moot; consequently, the petition for rehearing was de-
nied. 2
Disbarment Procedure
In In re Roy"3 it was alleged generally that the defendant
colluded in forty-five divorce suits; only thirty-six of the suits
were described and their records included in the plaintiff's peti-
tion. The supreme court decided that a cause of action was stated,
but that, as to the nine undescribed suits, the petition was too
vague and indefinite to require the defendant to answer. "In
disciplinary proceedings against an attorney formal and technical
38. Smalley v. Brown, 156 La. 669, 101 So. 16 (1924); and Interstate Rice
Milling Co., Inc. v. Hibernia Bank and Trust Co., 176 La. 308, 145 So. 548 (1933).
39. 204 La. 21, 14 So. (2d) 872 (1943).
40. Art. 867 et seq., La. Code of Practice of 1870; La. Rev. Stat. of 1870,§ 2593 et seq., as amended by Act 102 of 1928.
41. 205 La. 818, 18 So. (2d) 306 (1944).
42. "The petition for rehearing is denied on the ground solely that the
suit to remove the sheriff has become abated by the expiration of the term of
office for which he was serving at the time of the filing of this suit to remove
him." 205 La. 818, 828, 18 So. (2d) 306, 309.
43. 204 La. 256, 15 So. (2d) 79 (1943).
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pleadings are not essential, it being sufficient if the charges are
specific enough to inform him of the misconduct alleged. No
greater formality is required in the preliminary proceeding be-
fore the investigating committee."4' 4
The section of the State Bar Association's articles of incor-
poration, authorizing the supreme court to strike an attorney's
name from the rolls and cancel his license to practice law on
proof of his conviction of a felony, does not require the court to
inflict such penalty.' So noted the supreme court in Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Steiner," stating that it might, within
its discretion, either suspend or disbar the attorney.46 The fact
that the attorney repaid clients' money and the latter were will-
ing to withdraw charges did not relieve the attorney from lia-
bility already incurred. The attorney had taken fees without ren-
dering any professional services therefor.4 7
Where the Secretary of the Bar Association notified defen-
dant attorney thus: "I have been directed by the undersigned
Committee to notify you that an investigation will be had by it
of the alleged improper obtaining of divorces by you in various
cases in the Parish of St. Bernard," the supreme court held this
was not sufficient and specific notice. Section 3 of Article XIII,
of Articles of Incorporation of Louisiana State Bar Association,
requires reasonable notice and sufficient time and opportunity to
prepare."8




Baker v. Wilder' evidenced yet another unsuccessful struggle
to prove interruption of a mineral servitude by acknowledgment
in a lease, allegedly joint, under the Mulhern case.2 Again the
44. In re Fallon, 204 La. 955, 16 So. (2d) 532 (1943).
45. 204 La. 1073, 16 So. (2d) 843 (1944).
46. See La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
47. In re Craven, 204 La. 426, 15 So. (2d) 861 (1943).
48. In re Armstrong, 205 La. 67, 16 So. (2d) 908 (1943). See Sections 3, 4,
and 5 of Article XIII of Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar
Association.
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 204 La. 759, 16 So. (2d) 346 (1943).
2. Mulhern v. Hayne, 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
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